In this paper, a novel risk-based, two-objective (technical and economical) optimal reactive POWER dispatch method in a wind-integrated POWER system is proposed which is more consistent with operational criteria.  The technical objective includes the minimization of the new voltage instability risk index. The economical objective includes cost minimization of reactive POWER generation and active POWER loss. The proposed voltage instability risk employs a hybrid possibilistic (Delphi-Fuzzy)-probabilistic approach that takes into consideration the operator’s experience, the wind speed and demand forecast uncertainties when quantifying the risk index. The decision variables are the reactive POWER resources of the system. To solve the problem, the modified multi-objective particle swarm optimization algorithm with sine and cosine acceleration coefficients is utilized. The method is implemented on the modified IEEE 30-bus system. The proposed method is compared with those in the previously published literature, and the results confirm that the proposed risk index is better at estimating the voltage instability risk of the system, especially in cases with severe impact and low probability. In addition, according to the simulation results compared to typical security-based planning, the proposed risk-based planning may increase the security and economy of the system due to better utilization of system resources.

Privatization of POWER sector and establishment of competition in POWER supplying process, raised unprecedented challenges in POWER system operation and planning fields, such as preventive maintenance scheduling which was formerly, in traditional environment, managed centrally by dispatching center. Dispatching center role having been changed in restructured POWER systems, POWER producing companies play a more important role in PM scheduling process. The conflict between dispatching center being concerned about POWER system reliability and stability, and POWER generating companies profit maximization based behavior which cannot be defined properly thorough traditional optimization theory, may be modeled satisfactory thorough GAME theory approaches. In this paper, after modeling and solving PM scheduling process thorough GAME theory, discusses about resultant equilibrium states and predicts different POWER generation technologies behavior.

Attempts in establishing a balance of POWER is always one of the realistic approaches of countries in the international relations scope. This attempt is to maintain the status quo or to revise it. It seems that the natural tendency of countries in establishing balance of POWER with each other as realists claim, has currently put the United States (USA) in a historical and strategic dilemma. On the one hand, USA seeks to maintain its position as a hegemonic POWER, on the other hand, countries such as Russia, China and even India try to challenge this position and to establish balance with the hegemonic POWER. In this regard, nowhere in the world has USA been challenged strategically as in Asia for containing his hegemonic POWER. The main question is that how USA decreases the common threat from Russia and China and maintain its hegemonic position? In this line, the main hypothesis is that regarding the balance of POWER as distribution of POWER, USA seeks to utilize India for establishing the balance of POWER in central Asia. Also, India seeks to utilize the potential of USA for developing its sphere of influence in this region.

POWER Market, due to unique characteristics of POWER system, can not be considered as a competitive market. It is much more like an oligopoly market where small numbers of Generation Companies (GenCos) compete to supply the market demand. It became more obvious in 1990s and 2001 as some major crisis hit POWER markets around the globe. In such a situation, the ability of market participants could raise prices over the competitive level. On the other hand, there is also possible GenCos collude and as a result the market prices rise. The ability of raising the price in collusion is highly dependent on price elasticity of demand. In this paper, at first several reported recent research works related to the collusive behavior in the POWER market are reviewed. Then, an analytic model based on GAME theory is proposed to analyze the behavior of participants in competitive and collusive market states. Using the proposed model on a simple system, variation of the market price in both competitive & collusive states are investigated and effects of price elasticity on equilibrium point in a collusive state are studied. Furthermore, the numerical results obtained from the proposed collusion model and a monopolistic model of the market, are compared and the differences are interpreted.

POWER grid is one of the most important infrastructure of any society on which other infrastructures depend. Studies show that the false data injection cyberattack can cause transmission lines to overload. Usually, the POWER grid is capable of responding to the natural overloads of transmission lines, but if a cyberattack is accompanied by a targeted physical attack, the overload of transmission lines can become out of control, and consecutive outages can occur in the POWER grid’s transmission lines. This situation eventually leads to local or nationwide blackouts of the POWER grid. To confront the overload of transmission lines, the POWER grid’s operator removes the overloads by taking corrective measures such as using the upward and downward reserve POWER as well as load shedding. In this paper, we first show how a simultaneous cyber-physical attack can increase the amount of load shedding. Then a model based on GAME theory is presented to plan the load dispatch of the grid so that the operator can repel the cyber-physical attack with the lowest possible cost using corrective measures. The proposed model is simulated on a 5-bus test network and the results are analyzed.

Pollution and environmental protection in the present century are extremely significant global problems. POWER plants as the largest pollution emitting industry have been the cause of a great deal of scientific researches. The fuel or source type used to generate electricity by the POWER plants plays an important role in the amount of pollution produced. Governments should take visible actions to promote green fuel. These actions are often called the governmental financial interventions that include legislations such as green subsidiaries and taxes. In this paper, by considering the government role in the competition of two POWER plants, we propose a GAME theoretical model that will help the government to determine the optimal taxes and subsidies. The numerical examples demonstrate how government could intervene in a competitive market of electricity to achieve the environmental objectives and how POWER plants maximize their utilities in each energy source. The results also reveal that the government’s taxes and subsidiaries effectively influence the selected fuel types of POWER plants in the competitive market.

The Russian Empire and United Kingdom as two main players in the great GAME of nineteenth century kicked off a colonial rivalry in the geopolitical arena of Central Asia. However the repetition of this great GAME in the post-cold war world led to some criticisms to the geopolitical ideas dominating 19th and 20th centuries that focus on the geopolitics of resistance as one of the most important approaches in the geographical policies in the beginning of the third millennium.The present paper is an attempt to study the level of influence of these two approaches- domination and resistance - on the current of the new great GAME in Central Eurasia. The findings of the study indicate that the degree of congruity of the domination geopolitical approach is higher than that of the resistance approach. At the same time it is necessary to establish an active civil society based on sociopolitical reforms in the countries of the GAME field in order to materialize the principles of geopolitics of resistance.

In this paper, a new method for extending and relaxing the noise-coupling (NC) technique is proposed to enhance the noise-shaping order without adding the number of integrators. The noise-shaping order of the introduced ∑∆ modulator whit applying a second-order noise-coupling technique is enhanced and its performance with optimizing the noise transfer function (NTF) zeros is improved. Also, by removing the analog adder at feedforward path and transferring it to a new feedback branch before the last integrator and adding second-order NC path can be decreased the input voltage swing to the quantizer. Thus, by improving the modulator resolution, POWER consumption can be reduced. Mathematical analyses and behavioural simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the new NC method. To examine its performance, a 2nd-order single loop ΣΔ modulator was designed. The new noise-coupling method is used to achieve the three-order noise shaping to increase the resolution with low complexity and low-POWER. The results show an outstanding improvement in signal-to-noise and distortion ratio (SNDR) compared to the conventional structure.

The term "GAME GIS” implies to real spatially enabled GAMEs in which a special part of the world is virtually simulated, represented and managed. In fact, GAME GIS is an integrated system consists of video GAMEs and geographical information systems, aimed to simulate and representing spatially enabled environment. The achieved result of implementing a GAME GIS service can be exploited before a crisis for wise designing of a city and diminution of the aftermath casualties. As the decision making process plays the key role to reduce the losses, the need arises for using the models as much as close to the reality. By this, it is possible to use the virtual world in in the form of a GAME rather than experiencing the real world with real wounded and killed persons in. This enables us to recognize and manage a test environment for promoting the managing the real environment of a city during and before a natural hazard disaster like an earthquake.  ...